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 Enhancing transparency or issuing special passes?  
A comparative analysis of the adoption of lobbyist 
registers 
  Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on interest group politics by analyzing the 
adoption of lobbyist registers among 40 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development and European Union countries. After a long period of rare adoption, 12 
countries have decided to enhance transparency by regulating the access to 
policymaking. Statistical results and case studies demonstrate that corruption and the 
structure of the interest groups’ participation are significant functional explanations 
for regulating lobbying activities. At the onset of this spread and in spite of 
international organizations' advocacy, there is no evidence for any mechanism of 
countries' interdependence, indicating spurious diffusion.  
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1 Introduction 
Since 2000s, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has promoted lobbyist register as a way to increase transparency and accountability in 
the policy process among its member states. This activity resulted in the OECD 
member states’ agreement on “Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying” 
(OECD 2013). At the European Union (EU) level, an interinstitutional agreement 
between the European Parliament and the European Commission sets out the 
principles and rules for governing a common transparency register (European 
Parliament and European Commission 2014). This is the result of two decades of EU 
initiatives for promoting a more transparent governance and a structured dialogue 
with interest group (European Commission 1993). Only very few countries have 
regulated lobbying prior to these international activities,1 but in concomitance with 
them, Figure 1 shows that 12 EU and OECD countries adopted lobbyist register.2  
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
Extensive research in comparative politics has proved the diffusion of policy 
innovations (Brooks 2007, Berry & Berry 2007, Graham, Shipan & Volden 2013), 
amongst them the diffusion of regulatory governance innovations (Jordana, Levi-Faur 
& Fernandez i Marin 2011, Lee, Chang & Berry 2011, De Francesco 2013). In 
particular, scholars have pointed out that national policymakers learn and emulate 
policies from other countries (Meseguer 2004, Gilardi, Füglister & Luyet 2009, 
Gilardi 2010) and international organizations (Grigorescu 2003, Bearce & Bondanella 
2007, Cao 2009, De Francesco 2012). However, theory of policy diffusion 
 
1 The U.S. (1946), Germany (1951), Australia (1983) and Canada (1989). 
2 Lobbyist registers were adopted in Lithuania (2001), Poland (2005), Hungary (2006), Israel (2008), 
France (2009), Mexico (2010), Slovenia (2010), Austria (2012), Italy (2012), the Netherlands (2012), 
Chile (2014), and the United Kingdom (2014). 
acknowledges that the cumulative adoption of a policy adoption may be the result of 
fully independent decisions (Braun & Gilardi 2006, Berry & Berry 2007). Indeed, 
“spurious diffusion” denotes independent choices of a number of governments to 
adopt a “rational” policy innovation, in order to solve a common problem and to 
respond to common functional pressures (Braun & Gilardi 2006, 305) and internal 
sources of change (Tolbert & Zucker 1983).  
There is a relevant literature on the functional pressures concerning interest groups 
and lobbyism. Focusing on the difference between corporatist and pluralist regimes of 
interest intermediation, traditional research on interest groups remarks the importance 
of functional incentives within national political systems (Wilson 1982, Lijphart and 
Crepaz 1991). However, even the more recent research has focused on interest group 
coalitions in the policy process (Box-Steensmeier, Christenson & Hitt 2013, Heaney 
& Lorenz 2013, Beyers & Braun 2014) and the role of the media (Binderkrantz, 
Bonafont & Halpin 2017), rather than on the specific institutional constraints, such as 
lobbyist registers, that shape the behaviour of interest groups (Hojnacki, Kimball, 
Baumgartner, Berry & Leech 2012) by regulating their activities and access to 
policymaking. Furthermore, literature has specifically assessed the variation of 
lobbying regulation. In particular, previous research has analyzed parliamentary lobby 
regimes (Liebert 1995). Comparative analysis has held that lobbyist registers can be 
either a “hall pass” for lobbyists or an instrument for levelling the playing eld among 
interest groups that aim to participate in the political process (Holman 
& Luneburg 2012, 77).  
Analysing the spread in the new century among developed democracies (40 EU 
member states and OECD members and partners), this paper assesses to what extent 
independent reactions to similar functional pressures explain the adoptions of lobbyist 
register. Controlling for several proxies of policy interdependence, we maintain that 
two functional pressures explain this initial wave of adoptions of formal lobbyist 
registers. Firstly, the interaction between the size of a given country's economy and 
the level of corruption increases the likelihood of adoption. In richer democracies, 
high level of perceived corruption should result in less economic growth (because 
investors are facing economic insecurities) and high level of citizens' demand for 
transparency. Accordingly, policymakers have incentive to adopt innovations in order 
to tackle corruption. Secondly, we hold that the structure of interest groups impacts on 
whether governments have an incentive to regulate interest groups' activities. Notably, 
in countries placed in between the corporatist type and pluralist type of interest 
intermediation, policymakers have higher incentives to establish a lobbyist register 
that level the playing field for all types of interest groups.  
Trough an event history analysis and two in-depth case studies, this paper contributes 
to the literature on interest group politics by testing these alternative functions of 
lobbyist registers. The paper also adds to the policy diffusion literature by analyzing 
the spread of a policy innovation at the beginning of the spreading process and prior 
the saturation point, when most of countries have passed legislations. Such an 
analysis of spread with low proportions of adopters3 allows us to argue for rational 
and independent decisionmaking rather than policy interdependence and legitimation 
of the policy innovation (Tolbert & Zucker 1983). Because not many developed and 
developing democracies have yet regulated lobbying activities, this methodological 
strategy also allows us to make policy recommendations to international organizations 
who are promoting transparency of policymaking through lobbyist registers. They 
 
3 0.1 in 2000 and 0.375 in 2015. 
should be aware that lobbyist registers not only enhance transparency and tackle 
corruption, but also facilitate interest groups’ access to policymaking.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the state of the art of the comparative literature on lobbying regulation and 
identifies the main determinants of adoption. Section 3 illustrates our main 
expectations associated with the likelihood of adopting lobbyist registers. Section 4 
presents the data and the event history model. Section 5 presents the statistical results 
and Section 6 illustrates two case studies of Italy and Slovenia, confirming the drivers 
of adoption of lobbyist register as a means for enhancing transparency and providing 
privileged access to dominant economic interest groups. Section 7 concludes.  
2 Enhancing transparency or issuing hall passes? Lobbying regulation in the 
literature 
Although the adoption of lobbying registers is not a new phenomenon, few countries 
followed the example of the early adopters. The U.S. was the first country to regulate 
lobbying activities through the 1946 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. This 
legislation was a reaction of the Federal government to the adoption of lobbying 
registers in the (U.S.) States. Furthermore, in the context of postwar social policy 
challenges such as the provision of housing for veterans, lobbying regulation faced 
the institutional problem of dealing with strong interest groups, notably in the real 
estate market (Zeller 1948, 239-243).4 Another early adopter was the Federal 
Republic of Germany that regulated lobbying activities in 1951 (OECD 2016). 
Nowadays, interest groups are required to present the name of the organization, the 
place where the organization is registered, the name of the board members, the 
 
4 The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 replaced the act (OECD 2016). 
organization's area of interest, the number of members, and the name of the 
representatives, in order to be admitted to a hearing in parliament (BT 2014). It took 
until the early 1980s for another country to adopt lobby registers, precisely the 
Australian government created the Lobbyist Registration Scheme in 1983. After the 
abolishing the act in 1996, in 2008, the Australian government re-established a 
lobbyist registry.5 In Canada, the Lobbyists Registration Act was put into place in 
1989, and has been repeatedly amended since then (OECD 2016).  
Whereas most of the early adopters of lobbyist registers are Anglo-Saxon countries, 
Germany has a dierent institutional context of interest group inclusion, namely 
corporatism. In research on comparative politics, researchers distinguish broadly 
between corporatist and pluralist systems of interest group inclusion in the political 
process. Therein, corporatism refers to an institutional arrangement, in which the state 
“grant[s] a deliberate representational monopoly” (Schmitter 1974, 94) to interest 
groups. According to Lehmbruch (1977, 94), this form of interest intermediation has 
developed into an “institutionalized pattern of policy-formulation in which large 
interest organizations cooperate with each other and with public authorities”. To the 
contrary, pluralism refers to competitive and non-coordinated interest intermediation. 
It entails a form of interest group inclusion that rests on bilateral relations between the 
state and interest groups, as well as a low degree of coordination across different 
economic sectors (Siaro 1999, Lijphart 2012).  
Besides the institutional arrangements for participation, policymakers face the 
challenge of having to deal with the dark side of interest groups politics, namely 
corruption and other forms of illegal relations between policymakers and organized 
 
5 In the empirical analysis of this paper, we exclude Australia from our sample of countries because the 
abandonment of a policy innovation is against the general assumption of policy diffusion studies that 
consider the institutionalization of a reform as a granted step. 
interests. Therefore, the question of when and why policymakers actually adopt 
lobbyist registers is highly relevant. Although recent reviews of the interest group 
literature have demanded a greater focus on the connection of interest groups to the 
institutional environment (Hojnacki et al. 2012, 393) and to specific policy issues 
(Hacker & Pierson 2014, 656), there are no empirical analysis on the influence of the 
extent of interest intermediation and coordination on the adoption of institutional 
innovation ruling the political participation of interest groups themselves. Indeed, the 
main research focus of the interest group literature is twofold. On the one hand, it 
examines interest group strategies of coalition formation in the policy process 
(Heaney & Lorenz 2013), including how different interest groups interact within 
larger networks (Beyers & Braun 2014). On the other hand, the effect of interest 
groups is analyzed only with regard to policy decisions (Box-Steffensmeier, 
Christenson & Hitt 2013) rather than the decisions on institutional control over their 
political participation.  
Lobbying register is the main instruments for regulating interest groups influence. 
Regarding adoption, researchers have traced lobbying regulation through qualitative 
analyses. Chari, Hogan, and Murphy (2010) conducted the first systematic 
comparative analysis of the institutionalization of lobbyist registers. They identified 
several theoretical justifications for regulating lobbyists. Deliberative democratic 
theory revolves around the idea that “reasons for, and details behind, policy decisions 
should be publicly available” (Chari, Hogan & Murphy 2010, 5). Accordingly, 
regulating lobbyists via the establishment of a register has the potential to increase the 
transparency and accountability of policymaking and ultimately to enhance the public 
trust towards political institutions. Ideally, lobbyist registers would allow citizens to 
observe and monitor the interactions between policymakers and private interest 
groups at the stage of policy formulation. Through this function, lobbying regulations 
have the potential to hold policymakers and economic interest groups accountable. 
Chari, Hogan, and Murphy focused also on the theoretical justification for not 
regulating lobbyists, such as barriers to entry and the “dangers” of shedding light on 
the policy process. The idea of barriers to entry is based on the concept that lobbying 
regulation would limit the participation to the policy process exclusively to registered 
lobbyists. Increasing transparency on lobby activities can bring the danger of limiting 
the effectiveness of policy decisions based on negotiations and technical expertise 
(Chari, Hogan & Murphy 2010). By measuring the extent of regulation, Chari, Hogan, 
and Murphy (2010) classified the adopters in three regulatory environments of low, 
medium and high regulation. Germany, Poland and the EU are in the category with 
the lowest regulation, Lithuania, Hungary, Taiwan and Australia are in the category 
with medium regulations, and, finally, the U.S. is in the highest category.  
Holman and Luneburg (2012) develop an analysis of the adoption of lobbying 
registers along the logic of access. Rather than barriers to entry for the “not 
registered”, these authors highlighted lobbyists’ easiness of access to policymaking 
through the establishment of “special entry to the halls of government” (Holman & 
Luneburg 2012, 77). Consequently, “many of the European lobbying laws were 
designed to facilitate the interaction between business leaders and lawmakers in an 
effort to boost economic development, not to strengthen transparency and reduce 
corruption” (Holman & Luneburg 2012, 77). Thus, the purpose of lobbying registers 
is to formalize and legalize access to policymakers for those groups that provided 
politically valuable access goods (Bouwen 2004).  
Similarly to Chari, Hogan, and Murphy (2010), Holman and Lunenburg compare the 
North American experience with strong lobbying regulation vis-à-vis regulatory 
regimes of European countries composed of France, Germany, Lithuania and Poland 
with weak regulation and Austria and Slovenia with more stringent requirements for 
lobbyists. They conclude by noting that weak lobbyist register regimes provide 
business interests with a special access that is widely ignored when private interest 
groups have access anyway. The focus on the extent of regulation related to lobbyist 
registers has been analyzed also by American scholars. While Opheim (1991) 
explains the variation in the stringency of legal requirement and administrative 
procedure among the US states, Gray and Lowery (1994, 1997, 1998) use the same 
variable for discerning the influence of lobbying registers on the composition of 
interest groups.  
Lobbying regulation and registers have been also the focus of reviews of countries' 
experience conducted by international organizations. In two reports, the OECD's 
Public Government Committee compared the regulatory regimes of its members 
(OECD 2009) as well as self-regulated by lobbyists and alternative measures to 
government regulation (OECD 2012). The reports review standards that are 
exclusively founded on “building blocks” for providing a “Framework... that is 
designed to support decision makers when lobbying reaches the political agenda” 
(OECD 2009, 19). At the European level, in 2014 the Commission has started 
collecting data on the lobbying regulation as well as institutional measure to fight 
corruption through national anti-corruption reports.6 The year later, the same 
 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/index_en.htm 
Commission had launched a program for sharing experience on anti-corruption 
policies.7  
3 Determinants of lobbying regulation adoption 
Why does a government adopt lobbying registers? While controlling for 
administrative features and policy interdependence, we put forward three internal 
determinants hypotheses of why policymakers put into place regulations of lobbying 
activities. Firstly, functional problems pressures, namely the level of corruption 
conditional upon the level of economic development in the country, make adopting 
lobbying regulations more likely. Secondly, the structure of the interest groups 
inuence can impact on the adoption of interest groups registers. Thirdly, we point out 
whether the variation of political parties in government aects the adoption of lobby 
registers. The remainder of this section explains our hypotheses in detail and 
discusses these competing explanations.  
3.1 Corruption, transparency and economic development 
Lobbyist registers are considered as an institutional innovation that have the potential 
to enhance the citizens’ knowledge of who is influencing policymakers. Through the 
register, citizens should be able to observe, monitor, and hold accountable the 
incumbent that in their opinion is not pursing the public interest. In other words, the 
adoption of lobbying regulation is an act of the government in order to meet the 
public demand that more light should be shed on the interaction between politicians 
and interest groups, and thus make the policy process more transparent (OECD 2009). 
According to the deliberative democracy theory, one would expect that the demand 
 
7 ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/corruption/experience-sharing-programme/index_en.htm 
from the citizens for establishing a transparency mechanism of policymaking is more 
pressing in those countries where the level of corruption is relevant. This expectation 
however is based on the assumption of citizens’ capacity to monitor and sanction the 
behavior of elected officials and interest groups (Elster 1998, 1). Put differently, in 
the ideal-typical world of deliberative democracy, higher corruption should make the 
adoption of lobbying registers more likely.  
We argue that such an explanation would, however, be simplistic. High levels of 
corruption alone should not make the adoption of lobby registers more likely since 
corrupt policymakers would rather obstruct than support the regulation of lobbying. 
Nevertheless, in certain condition policymakers are not able to resist the public 
demand to enhance transparency. For example, “especially among the wealthier 
European economies that have been racked by government scandal and public 
cynicism in recent years, there is a concerted effort by governmental authorities to 
win back the public's confidence through renewed transparency in the policymaking 
process” (Holman & Luneburg 2012, 77). We hold that policymakers are particularly 
responsive to citizens’ demands to reduce corruption if the country is or has been an 
emerging market economy where economic development has created a positive mood 
amongst citizens due to new jobs, better education and improved public services, for 
example in Eastern Europe or Latin America. In these countries, governments want to 
reduce corruption – at least symbolically— because a comparatively high-level of 
corruption would stifle economic growth (Mauro 1997) and would cause resistance by 
citizens who would not want to see the democratic transition being jeopardized 
(Holman & Luneburg 2012, 77). In this case, lobby registers would strengthen the 
accountability of the lobbying process and signal to citizens and investors that they 
take the potential threat of corruption seriously. Therefore, we put forward the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: High levels of corruption makes the adoption of lobbying registers 
more likely, only in the case of economically developed countries.  
3.2 Interest groups, civil society structure 
The second part of our argument concerns the supply side of lobbying regulations and 
the reasons for policymakers to institutionalize their relationships with interest groups 
that are highly influential in the policymaking process. Intuitively, countries that have 
either rather corporatist or rather pluralist institutions of interest intermediation (Siaro 
1999, Lijphart 2012, 184) could both adopt lobbying registers, but for very different 
reasons. On the one hand, according to the corporatist logic, lobbyist registers may 
enhance the coordination of large and organized interest groups in the parliamentary 
process that are prevalent in corporatist systems. Indeed, lobbying regulation among 
European countries tend to strengthen the interaction among business and political 
elites (Holman & Luneburg 2012, 77). On the other hand, according to the pluralist 
logic of interest intermediation, a government might decide to adopt registers for 
lobbying activities in order to level the playing field for all groups that (potentially) 
seek access to government officials. The register has the purpose to institutionalize 
the process of interest representation, enhancing transparency and allowing 
competition amongst interest groups through a reduction of the competitive advantage 
of large and organized interest groups. The fact that the two pioneer countries that 
were first to adopt lobby registers comprise of were either one that is rather pluralist 
(U.S.) or rather corporatist (Germany) indicates that both functional logics are 
plausible.  
Instead of differentiating countries according to the corporatism/pluralism continuum, 
we propose an argument based on the structure of civil societies composed of larger 
and smaller (interest group) organizations. This assumption relies on the literature on 
the civil society structure (Bernhard 1993, Anheier 2004), which takes a more holistic 
approach to the study of civil society (Anheier 2004, 16), i.e. non-state and non-
partisan actors. Specifically, we focus on large and encompassing civil society 
organizations (CSOs), rather than smaller, more local, or narrowly construed 
organizations. We expect a direct causal relationship between the presence and the 
political influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations and the 
probability of adoption of lobbyist registers. However, this relationship is not linear.  
We hold that the impact of civil society structure on the probability of lobbyist 
register adoption follows the form of an inverse u-curve. This implies that countries 
that are characterized by either low or high political influence of large and organized 
CSOs are less likely to adopt lobbyist registers. In countries with no or low levels of 
political influence of large CSOs, policymakers would have little incentive to supply 
an institutional innovation for overseeing lobbying activities. In other words, the 
additional benefit for policymakers in supplying the register in a political system 
where there is already a level playing field among interest group organizations would 
be marginal. The incentive for policymakers to supply lobbyist registers is also low in 
countries where large CSOs dominate the policymaking process also thanks to 
preexisting institutions for interest intermediation and coordination. In other words, 
the additional benefit for policymakers in adopting an additional institution for 
coordinating with large CSOs would be marginal. According to the supply-side logic, 
policymakers have higher incentive to adopt lobbyist registers in countries where 
large CSOs are influential without dominating the political system.  
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between the political influence of large CSOs and the 
probability of lobbyist register adoption is not linear. Lower the political influence of 
large CSOs, less likely the adoption of lobbyist register; Higher the political influence 
of large CSOs, less likely the adoption since the existence of other institutional 
mechanisms of civil society representation and participation.  
3.3 Controlling for other explanations 
Next to the two discussed hypotheses, there are a number of other explanations to take 
into consideration in the empirical analysis. Precisely, these are the following factors:  
• Government ideology: By focusing on policymakers' incentive structure, the 
supply-side argument can be associated with the ideological position of 
governments. Policymakers, who are driven by ideological preference of 
consideration of economic growth vis-à-vis consideration of distribution and 
equality, for example by attracting investments (foreign or domestic), should 
be more inclined to create a context of legal security for companies. 
Accordingly, policymakers have higher incentives to adopt an innovation 
regulating the lobbying activities. In this case, the register would strengthen 
the accountability of the lobbying process and signal to investors and business 
community a credible commitment towards a transparent intermediation 
between policymakers and interest groups and business. The expectation here 
is that right-wing governments should be more interested than left-wing 
government to improve the chances of each single business interest to be 
represented and influence their policymaking, by reforming the modes of 
interest groups intermediation.  
• Other macroeconomic factors: Administrative innovations such as a lobbyist 
register may be associated to administrative and economic complexity. The 
increasing complexity of modern policymaking requires a rational 
administrative system so as to enhance capacity and efficiency (Bennett 1997). 
Policymaking needs to be based on supervision and control and the 
standardization of procedures. The greater the complexity and size of 
economy and government, the greater the necessity to enhance the flows of 
information and strengthen the citizens’ control over lawmakers and business 
interests. Economic globalization is one of the main explanation of diffusion 
of political institutions (Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett 2007, Garrett 1995, 
Garrett 1998). The adoption of administrative reform is a way that 
governments signal to international investors that they pursue modern forms 
of governance (De Francesco 2012). Furthermore, according to the political 
economy perceptive the register can facilitate the establishment of a new 
channel of communication between interest groups and lobbies “that are either 
international in structure, or co-operate through international coalitions” 
(OECD 2009, 46) and lawmakers. Accordingly, a given country with high 
levels of trade openness is more likely to adopt a lobbyist register.  
• Administrative ecology and administrative tradition: The adoption and 
implementation of administrative innovations may follow specific evolution 
patterns. Lobbyist register cannot be considered in isolation from other 
administrative mechanisms for enhancing the transparency of policymaking. 
Accordingly, we control for the adoption of other administrative requirements 
for enhancing transparency such as administrative procedure act and freedom 
of information act. Lobbyist register as a new control mechanism of the 
interaction between interest groups and elected official is necessarily 
embedded in a country's democratic and constitutional setting (OECD 2009, 
18). Indeed, administrative culture and state tradition “play a role in defining 
the way in which administration is conducted, and the receptivity of the 
administrative system to change” (Peters 1997, 78). Legal origins are proxy 
variables for identifying difference also in administrative law (De Francesco 
2012).  
• EU and OECD influence and other diffusion hypotheses: Being a member of 
the OECD and the EU could have a relevant impact on the likeliness of 
adoption of lobbyist register – similar to other policy fields (Trein 
forthcoming). Both international organizations have increasingly active in 
promoting the control of lobbying activity through the establishment of a 
register. Another expression of countries’ interconnectedness to the 
international environment is the extent of a country’s participation to 
international networks for tackling political corruption. Furthermore, spatial 
proximity (Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2016) and the extent of a country’s trade 
openness could lead to higher probability to adopt lobbyist register.  
4 Data and models 
Differently from previous comparative analyses of lobbying regulation, we focus on 
the probability of a given countries to implement lobbyist register in a specific year, 
as a dependent variable for our analysis. This methodological choice allows us to treat 
lobbying regulation as an administrative innovation and refer to the vast literature on 
policy diffusion and administrative reform. We rely on the OECD’s data in order to 
determine the year of implementation for the sample of 40 countries. The data is 
based on the OECD information regarding the adoption of lobbying registers (OECD 
2016).  
Data on our main independent variables stem from the V-dem data set (Coppedge, 
Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, 
Knutsen, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Staton, Zimmermann, Sigman, Andersson, 
Mechkova & Miri 2016). To analyze the first hypothesis, we use the “v2x_corr” 
variable for the citizens’ perception of corruption. This index provides averages 
values of the following four sub-indexes: i) public sector corruption index; ii) 
executive corruption index; iii) the indicator for legislative corruption; and iv) the 
indicator for judicial corruption. In addition, we use the World Bank’s data to 
measure GDP per capita (that we divided it by 100,000 in order for the scale to be 
convenient for our analysis), and interacted it with the corruption variable. We 
centered the interaction effect around the mean in order to make the interpretation of 
the results more straightforward. From the V-dem data set, we also use the 
\v2csstruc_1" variable which measures the extent to which large encompassing CSOs 
are highly influential in the policymaking. Specifically, this variable is constructed 
around an expert surveys that attempts “to characterize the relative influence of large 
mass constituency CSOs versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs” 
(Coppedge et al. 2016, 237). Varying between 0 and 1, this variable is the mean of the 
respondent frequencies and the association of a given countries to the fact that large 
CSOs are influential. The survey specifies that corporatist systems or large CSO that 
are highly influential belong to this category of civil society structure. Accordingly, 
“[t]he voice of such organization is recognized by the government and is accorded 
special weight by policymakers” (Coppedge et al. 2016, 237-8). For all variables from 
the V-dem data set, we lagged the observation for three years in order to avoid an 
endogeneity issue and to have as many observations as possible since for most 
countries in the sample the last available observation is in 2012. Table 1 summarised 
the descriptive statistics of the main independent variables and control variables. To 
model the inverse-u impact of the interest group structure on the adoption of lobbying 
registers, we square the variable that measures interest group structure.8 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
To operationalize the control variables, we use a variety of dierent measures. 
Regarding the additional macroeconomic controls, namely the openness of the 
economy, we use information on the trade volume based on World Bank Data. Higher 
trade volumes should make adoption more likely. Concerning administrative ecology 
and administrative tradition, we control for several measures. Firstly, we take into 
consideration whether a country adopted an administrative procedures act and the 
freedom of information act. If a country implemented these two administrative 
innovations, the adoption of lobbying registers becomes more likely (De 
Francesco 2013). Secondly, we take into consideration the legal origin of the 
administration. Therefore, we created a number of binary variables that measure 
dierent types of legal origins. Notably, these are English legal origin, Scandinavian 
legal origin, German legal origin, French, legal origin, and Socialist legal origin 
countries (La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1999). Thereby, we have a clear 
expectation only for English legal origin countries. They should be amongst the early 
adopters since three of the first adopting countries – the U.S., Australia, and Canada – 
are all countries with an English legal origin. Thirdly, we control for the overall size 
of government – hypothesizing that a larger size of government should make adoption 
 
8 Plümper and Martin use a similar strategy to demonstrate the eect of democracy on economic 
performance (Plümper & Martin 2003). 
more likely. In addition, we control for EU and OECD membership using binary 
variables, as well as for the duration of democracy harkening again back to the V-dem 
data set (Coppedge et al. 2016). The data for the regarding political parties are taken 
from the “Database of Political Institutions” (Beck, Clarke, Gro, Keefer & Walsh 
2001) (Table 1).  
4.1 Event history model 
Event history analysis is the established methodology among policy innovation 
studies. The data set covers 40 countries and starts in 2000, 3 years before the start of 
the OECD engagement with lobbying regulation. Therefore, we exclude the four early 
adopting countries – the U.S., Germany, Australia, and Canada – from the analysis. 
Among the possible EHA models, we have chosen the logit model that allows for 
exibility in the analysis (Langner, Bender, Lenz-Tönjes, Küchenho & Blettner 2003, 
1). In time-series cross-sectional analysis, logit models however come with two 
specification issues (Buckley & Westerland 2004). The first one is related to the 
likelihood that the observations are temporally dependent (Buckley & Westerland 
2004, Mooney 2001). To consider “time seriously” (Beck, Katz & Tucker 1998), we 
have inserted three time variables, t, t2/10, t3/100, in the discrete EHA (Carter & 
Signorino 2010). The second issue concerns the selection of an appropriate functional 
form in the analysis of “rare events” (King & Zeng 2001) that should be guided by 
appropriate substantive and statistical theory (Buckley & Westerland 2004). The issue 
here has to do with the underlying distributional assumption within a logit model that 
the maximum marginal effect occurs at the value π = .5.  
5 Statistical results 
The results of our analysis suggest that if we insert an interaction effect of the level of 
corruption and the degree of GDP into the analysis, the regression coefficient for the 
interaction effect demonstrates a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
adoption of lobbying registers. This result suggests that the combined increase of 
corruption and the size of the economy makes regulating lobbying registers more 
likely overall. Thus, the separate effect of both – corruption and size of the economy – 
displays a negative effect on adoption if the other variable is fixed at the mean. 
Concerning the impact of the interest group structure, the models show that if we 
include the indicator measuring the effect of interest groups structure, the effect is 
positive but not significant statistically. It is only when we add the squared term of the 
interest group structure variable to the model that the effect becomes stronger and 
statistically significant. Therefore, the results of our analysis reveal an inverse-u effect 
of interest group structure on the adoption of lobbying registers, which is highly 
significant statistically. With respect to the effect of color of political parties in 
government, our analyses do not reveal a clear result. Overall, these results indicate 
support for of the two hypotheses that we formulated before (Table 2). We will now 
discuss the findings for the control variables and the robustness of our findings.  
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
Regarding the control variables, the results indicate that bigger government, a strong 
interest group lobby network, German legal origin, and more trade make adoption 
more likely. On the other hand, the presence of an Administrative Procedure Act, a 
strong interest group lobby network, OECD membership, and EU membership make 
adoption less likely – although none of the variables are significant statistically (Table 
2). Interestingly, the spatial lag variable has a strong negative – although not 
statistically significant – effect. This finding shows that the case of lobbying registers 
is non-typical for a diffusion process because the presence of such an innovation in a 
neighboring country did not increase the probability of adoption by countries close 
by. The previous adoption of a Freedom of Information Act is dropped from the 
analysis and no coefficients can be obtained. Contrary to our expectation, this implies 
that the presence of a Freedom of Information Act, i.e. a legal basis that grants 
citizens access to all government documentation, always comes along with the 
absence of a lobbying register (Table 4, Appendix). This can be explained by the fact 
that the presence of an encompassing governance mechanism for transparency 
excludes the necessity of a further administrative requirement concerning the 
interaction between lawmakers and interest groups. This incompatible association 
between FOIA and lobbyist registers is also represented when we look at legal origin 
of countries. If the legal background of a country reclines to a Scandinavian legal 
origin, traditionally associated with high level of transparency through FOIA, there 
will definitively be no lobbying register present. Put differently, any other legal origin 
than the Scandinavian is associated with the adoption of a lobbyist register (Table 4, 
Appendix). Nevertheless, if we examine the effect of the other legal origins in 
separate models without accounting for the Scandinavian model, the effects are not 
significant statistically (not shown).  
We inserted the control variables to test the robustness of our results concerning the 
main variables we are interested in, in terms of statistical significance. Two of the 
three main variables of interest – interaction of corruption and size of the economy 
and interest group structure – pass at least some tests of robustness (Model 3). 
Nevertheless, a second set of robustness tests shows that the effects for corruption and 
the economy do not remain statistically significant whereas those for the variables 
regarding interest groups do (Model 4). This indicates that – overall – we can have 
some confidence in the robustness of our findings, but the results regarding interest 
group structure are a bit more statistically robust.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
To better interpret the results of our analysis, we will proceed with a graphic 
presentation of the main effects of interest, beginning with the interaction of 
corruption and the size of the economy. For cases of low economic development, an 
increase in the perceived corruption does not have a positive effect on the adoption of 
lobbying registers. Nevertheless, if the size of the economy increases, and corruption 
along with it, the probability to adopt lobbying registers augments as well (Figure 2). 
This relationship is especially present in economies that aim at entering the club of 
the EU and/or the OECD or have recently been admitted these circles, such as Baltic 
countries or Mexico. The findings support the logic that we put forward in the 
elaboration of Hypothesis 1, namely that countries seeking to sustain their economic 
development and having problems with corruption tend to adopt lobbying registers. 
Against this background, regulating lobbying activities is beneficial as it signals to 
new investors that there is legal stability and somewhat “fair” competition. What is 
more, adopting lobbying registers secures the access to the policy process for 
international companies that are already in the country. Such institutional innovations 
are important on the road to a highly developed economy that is integrated in 
international institutions and organizations. Concerning countries that have already a 
very highly developed economy, the interaction of economic growth and corruption 
does not increase the probability of regulating lobbying activities. The reason for this 
is simply that the levels of corruption are relatively lower than in emerging economies 
and that the countries are already embedded in the international economy as well as in 
international institutions and organizations of economic governance (Figure 2).  
Concerning the effect of the interest group structure on the adoption of lobbying 
regulation, our regression analysis pointed to an inverse-u curve effect of interest 
group structure on policy adoption. The data that we use to measure the structure of 
the interest groups in a country provides a scale that ranges from no influence of large 
interest groups to the dominance of large interest groups. According to the regression 
analysis, the probability of adopting lobby registers increases in contexts with a mix 
of large and small groups. Contrariwise, if small or large interest associations 
dominate regulating lobbying activities is less probable (Figure 3a). The explanation 
for these results are straightforward: in case large interest groups dominate, 
policymakers have the incentive to issue special passes; once there is a mix of large 
and small groups, regulations serve at leveling the playing field for everyone. On the 
other hand, if there are mostly small interest groups adopting lobbying registers is not 
necessary. In case the demand for government attention comes from relatively small 
and similarly sized groups, competition should work well and policymakers would 
not need to adopt lobbying registers.  
  INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
Contrary to our expectations, the results show no clear effect for the type of party in 
government. We hypothesized that right parties in government are more likely to 
adopt lobbying registers since they closer to interest groups and therefore more 
interested in issuing special passes. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis did not 
support this finding. The results show that the effects of the coefficients change. 
Under some configuration, of control variables, the effect of right parties is positive 
(Models 1-3, Table 2) but this changes with different controls (Model 4, Table 2). The 
graphical representation underlines this finding.  
The regression models support – at least to some extent – the hypotheses that we 
developed based on the secondary literature. Nevertheless, the sizes of the effects 
differs considerably. Whereas the interaction of perceived corruption and size of the 
economy could increase the probability to adopt lobbying registers considerably, this 
is less the case for the interest group structure variable. Precisely, if the size of the 
GDP and the corruption are both around the median value of the sample or above, the 
probability to regulate lobbying increases almost by 50 percent (Figure 2). To the 
contrary, the eect size for interest group is much smaller. In case that the interest 
group structure is at the median value of the scale, i.e. there is a mix of large and 
small interest groups, the probability of adopting lobbying registers increases by five 
percent relative to the overall sample of 40 countries (Figure 3). Overall, these results 
suggest the combination of a certain type of problem pressure and more importantly a 
specific structure of the interest groups landscape affect the adoption of lobbying 
registers.  
6 Adopting lobbyist register: the case of Italy and Slovenia 
In this section, we qualify our statistical findings by tracing the policy development in 
Italy and Slovenia. These countries are “pathway cases” (Gerring 2007) that serve to 
elucidate causal mechanisms of adopting lobbying registers. In time-series cross-
section models, “a pathway case is a country (or unit) that undergoes variation in X1 
and Y through time, as predicted by the theory, whereas all other factors (X2) hold 
constant” (Gerring 2007, 245). The statistical analysis shows that two explanatory 
factors are statistically significant and accordingly we selected two pathway cases for 
both corruption and civil society structure. Whereas Italy is a case where the adoption 
of lobbyist registers is strongly influenced by the interaction between economic 
growth and perceived corruption; Slovenia is associated with the civil society 
structure. We idenfitied the two cases by plotting the effect of economic development 
and perceived corruption on the adoption of lobbyist register. Figure 4 shows the 
probabilities for different GDP per capita values and plot the country mean against 
corruption. It captures that Italy lies closer to the logistic regression line with GDP per 
capita at the value of 0.907 (the highest value among the countries that adopted a 
lobbyist register). Similarly, Slovenia lies closer to the logistic regression line 
capturing the effect of civil society structure on the probability of adoption.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE 
Having identified these two cases, the next two sections describe the political debate 
and actors’ position leading to the adoption to the lobbyist registers in these two 
countries.  
6.1 Italy 
In Italy, lobbyist registers have not adopted through an overarching legislation in spite 
of 45 legislative initiatives, 10 tabled during the current legislature (Servizio studi 
della Camera dei deputati 2016). Yet, in 2012 the Ministry of Agriculture adopted a 
public list of lobbyists engaged within agribusiness (Servizio studi della Camera dei 
deputati 2016) and established a consultation procedure for new regulatory proposals 
(Transparency International Italia 2014, 9). This is the first regulation that denes what 
lobbyist is and species rights and obligations associated with the activities of interest 
groups in the policymaking process. The enactment of this ministerial regulation was 
considered by the OECD as the event for considering Italy as a country that has 
adopted lobbyist register. Also four regions (Abruzzo in 2010, Calabria in 2016, 
Molise in 2004, and Tuscany in 2002) (Servizio studi della Camera dei deputati 2016) 
institutionalised the former EU model of a voluntary lobbyist register, a list of 
allowed lobbying activities and specific administrative sanctions (Transparency 
International Italia 2014, 9). In 2016 the Camera dei deputati internally regulated the 
lobbying activities through a lobbyist register, maintained by the Office of the 
President.  
A recent report by Transparency International (2014) remarked how lobbying has a 
negative perception by the Italian general public. Lobbying and corruption are 
concepts that tend to overlap in the public and political discourse. And the lack of a 
legislative framework for interest groups' participation increases the opacity of how 
the positions of interest groups and stakeholders are collected and taken into account 
by policymakers, informally and through personal and social relations.  
The Italian policymaking process is still dominated by traditional interest groups, 
business organizations and trade unions. Both are still represented in institutions such 
as the National Council of Economics and Labour. Furthermore, in Italy the 
institutional and political tradition considers the political parties as the only legitimate 
to influence the decisionmaking, whereas interest groups should remain out of the 
policymaking. This negative connotation is recurrent in the judgement of the same 
organised interest groups such as the main organisation representing the Agriculture 
business (Transparency International Italia 2014, 10). In other words, in Italy there is 
still a strong resistance from politicians and interest groups to “legalise" lobbyism as a 
legitimate activity of interest groups and stakeholders. This is reflected in all 
legislative proposals before mid-2000. They have a negative conception of lobbyism 
as a representation of corruption that should be limited. For instance, the 1997 
legislative proposal was discussed within the Parliamentary Committee against 
corruption. Only in the mid-2000, the proposals have been built up on the idea of 
procedures that enhance the transparency for the legitimate activities of lobbyists 
(Transparency International Italia 2014, 11). Nevertheless, there is a clear 
concomitance between the 2012 adoption of the lobbyist register within the Ministry 
of Agriculture and the adoption of a series of anti-corruption legislative measures. 
The 2012 anti-corruption law9 foresees corruption practices of interest groups and the 
establishment, in 2014, of a national anti-corruption agency civil servants. 
Furthermore, lobbyist register was one of the main institutional innovations for ghting 
corruption listed in a report drafted by the Ministry of Public Administration in 2012 
(Italian Government 2012).  
Overall, In Italy lobbyist register has been constantly associated with measures to 
tackle corruption and the opacity of lawmaking process. This association however has 
been playing a negative role also by obstructing the adoption of lobbyist registers. 
Indeed, it is only when the political discussion shifted towards the legalization of the 
lobbyist activities that lobbyist registers appeared at the regional and ministerial level 
as well as at within the lower chamber of the Parliament. This combination of drivers 
for the adoption can be attested also by the low scores associated with the overall 
level of transparency of lawmaking process with no mechanism for “legislative 
footprint” and an extensive access to information and legislative documents, with the 
level of integrity in the relationship between policymakers and interest groups, and 
 
9 Legge n. 90 of 6 November 2012. 
with the level of equality of access to legislative process (Transparency International 
Italia 2014).  
Notwithstanding the lack of a national legislation on lobbyism, the OECD considered 
Italy as a country who adopted lobbyist register. This is another interesting piece of 
evidence stemming from this case study. The inclusion of Italy along with other 
countries that have a stronger institutionalization of lobbyist register emphasises both 
the lack of clarity in the conceptualization of lobbyist register by this international 
organization, as well as the strengthening of the frame of the OECD to conceive 
lobbying regulation as a mode for enhancing the transparency and integrity of the 
policymaking.  
Overall, the case of Italy tends to confirm the explanation of transparency rather than 
the formalization of a system that allows interest groups and dominant civil society 
organizations to have a privileged access to the policymaking. Indeed, the rule of the 
lower chamber of the Parliament excludes from the definition of lobbying the 
activities related to formal and informal hearings within legislative committees and 
commissions (Camera dei deputati 2016) when lobbyists can exercise effectively their 
inuence towards lawmakers (Servizio studi della Camera dei deputati 2016). 
Furthermore, as Petrillo (2017, 212) put it: “The physical access to the Parliament 
buildings is instead regulated by customs. There are no specific rules enforcing an 
equal right of access to all the stakeholders”. 
6.2 Slovenia 
Contrary to Italy, Slovenia has adopted one of the most comprehensive lobbying 
regulation in Europe. According to Mulcahy (2015), the 2010 “Integrity and 
Prevention of Corruption Act” establishes a dual information system for enhancing 
the transparency of interest groups' influence. On the one hand, public officials are 
demanded to report on each meeting with a lobbyist,10 on the other hand, professional 
lobbyists annually summarize their activities. The public agency in charge for 
enforcing the lobbying regulation is the national anti-corruption agency that has 
enough power to sanction no-compliance.  
Similarly to Italy, the adoption of lobbyist registered has been embedded in national 
anti-corruption programme and the overall negative perception of lobbying (Fink-
Hafner 2017). However, the two case studies differ for the extent of interest groups 
involvement in neo-corporatist arrangements. Whereas in Italy the adoption of 
lobbyist register is mainly due the attempt to enhance policy-making transparency by 
collecting data of who are the lobbyist, in Slovenia lobbying regulation and lobbyist 
register provide an additional channel of influence for economic interest groups who 
may “use all three routes to influence policymaking: (1) the neo-corporatist institution 
(the Economic and Social Council); (2) functional representation in the National 
Council11 ; and (3) lobbying both the executive as well as the National Assembly” 
(Fink-Hafner 2017, 303). And “[n]on-economic interest groups more or less depend 
on financial support and the openness of the (Slovenian and/or EU-level) state—and 
therefore face difficulties with actively and autonomously engaging in policymaking 
processes” (Fink-Hafner 2017, 303). Accordingly in the concomitant process of 
democratization and Europeanization, lobbying in Slovenia had increasingly become 
part of the political activity and democratic practice (Verčič & Tkalac Verčič 2012, 
Fink-Hafner 2017). This interpretation is also confirmed by the fact that in Slovenia 
 
10 A public officer has to record and transmit to her superior and to the national anti-corruption agency 
the followings: i) the date, place, and subject matter of the lobbying contact; ii) the lobbyist's name and 
who they represented; and iii) any documents submitted by the lobbyist. 
public relations are considered as a professional activity within a corporativism 
system that impact on the public relations industry itself that must contain elements of 
corporativism (Verčič 2003).  
7 Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the adoption of lobbying registers across 40 countries. We started 
from the question concerning why there are differences regarding the adoption of 
lobbying registers around the world. Based on a Discrete Event History Analysis, our 
analysis demonstrates that mainly two internal determinants explain the wave of 
spurious diffusion between 2000 and 2015. Firstly, a specific combination of the size 
of the economy and corruption explain why governments put into place lobbying 
registers. For example, if the size of the economy increases and corruption is high, 
policymakers tend to put into place lobbyist registers. Our explanation for this pattern 
is that politicians have an incentive to regulate lobbying if they want to develop the 
economy. In this case, they want to attract investors and cater companies that are 
already in the country. Legalizing the lobbying process creates legal certainty for 
corporations and increases therefore the attractiveness of a country for investors.  
Secondly, we demonstrate that specific conditions in the interest group structure of a 
country make adoption more likely. Precisely, if large interest groups dominate, or 
there is a mixture of large and small interest groups that compete for government 
influence, policymakers put into place lobbying regulation. We argue that these two 
conditions create incentives for decisions makers to adopt lobbying regulations 
because they either want to legalize the influence of the dominating groups or aim at 
levelling the playing field in case the size of interest groups varies. Other factors have 
less explanatory power.  
Our results provide an interesting explanation for the adoption of lobbying registers to 
the literature. Nevertheless, there are limitations to our analysis. The spread process 
regarding the lobbyist registers is in its course and within ten years' time many more 
countries might have adopted lobby registers, and potentially diffusion than internal 
functional explanations might become more powerful.  
However, an empirical analysis of the initial wave of adoption allows us to make 
practical recommendations to international organizations engaged in the provision of 
international best practices for policy-making transparency. Although international 
organizations have correctly associated lobbyist registers with the issue of corruption, 
it is important to note that the promotion of this institutional solution in less 
developed countries may lead to symbolic adoption. Furthermore, the empirical 
findings partially support that the institutional structure of interest group 
representation is an important factor for explaining the adoption of lobbying 
regulation. Accordingly, international recommendations should take into account the 
structure of interest groups in an adopting country. And it is necessary to properly 
distinguish regulation that levels the playing field for lobbyists from a mere issue of 
special passes to dominant interest groups.  
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